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It is a familiar shibboleth among public ¯nance economists that decentral-
ization of business taxation to lower-level governments can give rise to un-
desirable competition for mobile tax bases, and a \race to the bottom" in
tax rates. Despite such concerns, a number of authors have recently ob-
served that a system of intergovernmental transfers similar to those exist-
ing in many countries may in principle serve as a corrective device for local
business tax competition, discouraging beggar-thy-neighbor tax policies and
even under some conditions guaranteeing the e±ciency of decentralized poli-
cies.
Under such transfer systems, known as capacity equalization or foun-
dation grants, each government receives a transfer equal to the di®erence
between its measured tax base and either the average base of all regions
or a measure of ¯scal needs, multiplied by some target tax rate. Thus a
capacity equalization grant is an equity-enhancing device that insures that
each jurisdiction can achieve some target level of spending determined by
federal authorities, as long as it sets its own tax rate at least as high as the
target level.1 As Smart (1998) and KÄ othenbÄ urger (2002) observed, however,
an increase in local tax rates causes measured tax bases to decline, as tax-
payers shift to other regions of the country or to other, more lightly taxed
activities|and so causes capacity equalization transfers to rise. Thus the
grants in e®ect subsidize tax increases and penalize tax cuts by local govern-
ments, and the e®ect is larger the greater is the equalization rate (sometimes
referred to as \taxback rate") at which de¯ciencies in local ¯scal capacity
are compensated through the transfer formula.2
In this paper, we look for empirical evidence of the e®ects of equalization
grants on local tax policy using data on a large set of German municipalities.
The German case is an especially interesting one to examine, since munici-
palities there levy a tax on resident businesses, known as Gewerbesteuer, at
rates that average about 16 per cent of incomes. Since interjurisdictional
mobility and the pressures of tax competition in such a setting should in
principle be high, the equalization grants system may play an important, if
1The capacity equalization principle currently forms the basis for transfer systems in
Australia, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland, as well as local school district ¯nance
formulas in many US states.
2This e®ect is clearest when considering a receiving region with a tax rate equal to
the target tax rate at which capacity de¯ciencies are compensated: At this point, further
increases in the rate will appear to create no deadweight loss to the region, as the increase
in equalization transfers exactly compensates for marginal losses in private consumption.
Thus equalization tends to drive tax rates above the target tax rate.
2unintended, role in maintaining current rates of taxation.
Our empirical approach relies on di®erences in tax-setting incentives fac-
ing municipalities that qualify for the systems of \regular" and \supplemen-
tary" equalization transfers, and in particular the court-ordered reforms in
eligibility for supplementary transfers that occurred in the state of Lower
Saxony (Niedersachsen) in 1999. Regular equalization transfers are available
to municipalities whose ¯scal capacity falls below a target level, while sup-
plementary transfers are targeted at municipalities with considerably lower
than average ¯scal capacity. About three-quarters of the 1022 municipalities
in Lower Saxony receive one or both types of equalization transfers. The ef-
fect of the 1999 reform was to reduce the equalization rate facing municipal-
ities eligible for supplementary transfers, while increasing the equalization
rate for other, ineligible municipalities. The former group of municipali-
ties is therefore hypothesized to levy lower tax rates than the latter one in
response to the reform.
Since the equalization formula itself implicitly de¯nes the sets of munic-
ipalities that are eligible and ineligible for supplementary grants, identi¯ca-
tion of incentive e®ects of equalization must address the inherent problems
of self-selection. The reason is that a jurisdiction can to some extent in°u-
ence the ¯scal capacity and thus the program type it is eligible for. The
corresponding equalization transfer eligibility and tax policy are then both
endogenous. This may generate a bias with simple mean comparison esti-
mates of a transfer reform on the tax setting of the eligible municipalities
relative to the non-eligible ones. To avoid this bias, we address the problem
of self-selection by applying switching regression and matching procedures
in the empirical analysis.
Two sources of heterogeneity enable the identi¯cation of the reform ef-
fect on tax rates. First, to the extent that municipalities respond heteroge-
neously to a change in supplementary transfers within a federal union (as
the reform entails for municipalities in Lower Saxony), the di®erential e®ect
can be estimated using di®erences in business tax policy between the sub-
sample of supplementary transfer recipients and an appropriate within-state
control group. The construction of the latter group should pay attention to
the problem of self-selection into supplementary transfer eligibility. Second,
since municipal equalization schemes di®er among German states (LÄ ander),
one can identify the e®ect of a transfer reform by comparing the change
in tax policy between municipalities in the reforming and a non-reforming
state. In our analysis, we estimate the reform e®ect on municipalities in
Lower Saxony by a comparison with the 2056 municipalities in the state of
Bavaria, which experienced no reform in the equalization system over our
31994-2004 sample period.
Empirical work on the incentive e®ects of equalization programs has
evolved only recently. Baretti et al. (2002) provide evidence that the equal-
ization system among German states implicitly taxes tax revenues allocated
to states through revenue-sharing arrangements. States do not have explicit
taxing powers. Thus, the e®ect of ¯scal equalization on tax policy cannot
be identi¯ed therein. Hayashi and Boadway (2001) report empirical results
consistent with the idea that Canadian provinces conform in their tax rate
setting to the tax rate of the province of Ontario which predominantly de-
termines the average provincial tax rate used to compute the standard ¯scal
capacity in the Canadian equalization formula. Smart (2006) extends their
approach and ¯nds a robust e®ect of equalization on the tax policies of grant-
receiving governments in Canada. Dahlby and Warren (2003) ¯nd a similar
incentive e®ect for Australia. Buettner (2006) examines the combined e®ect
of vertical (revenue-sharing) and horizontal (equalization) grants on the tax
policies of municipalities in the German state of Baden-WÄ urttemberg, and
¯nds signi¯cant responses. The identi¯cation of this e®ect however relies on
year-to-year changes and within-state/year cross-sectional variation in the
equalization rate, which may be subject to the self-selection problems just
discussed.3
The problem of self-selection has not yet surfaced at the heart of exist-
ing research on the incentive e®ects of equalization programs. Furthermore,
previous work has not exploited information on a large-scale reform of the
equalization system in one state of a federal union to identify the e®ect on
tax rates. Only the latter enables an identi¯cation of the reform-induced
e®ects on di®erent groups of municipalities according to their transfer eligi-
bility status. The reason is that, with the eligibility status being endogenous,
intra-state variation in the outcome variable is required to identify the di®er-
ential impact on treatment and control in the reform state, Lower Saxony,
while inter-state variation is required to identify the average e®ect in the
3In the German system of ¯scal arrangements, municipalities are required to levy a
tax on their business tax bases that is transferred to higher-level (county and state) gov-
ernments, as well as receiving payments from or contributing to the equalization grant
system. Formally, vertical revenue sharing has an e®ect that is analogous to horizontal
equalization, to the extent that county-level taxes are \passed on" to ¯rms by municipal-
ities. Buettner (2006) estimates the combined e®ect of the two. In contrast, our paper
looks at the e®ect of horizontal equalization alone. As well, Buettner's approach to iden-
tifying the tax-raising e®ect relies on variation in county-level tax rates, which may be
correlated with other determinants of tax rates of municipalities within the county. In
contrast, our estimates are identi¯ed solely from the asymmetric changes in equalization
rates induced by a state-wide policy reform.
4reform state (across state di®erence in di®erence analysis).
We ¯nd a signi¯cant e®ect of the reform on local business tax rates. As
hypothesized, tax rates in eligible municipalities fell gradually in the four
years following the reform, relative to ineligible municipalities' rates. The
overall impact on the gap in business tax rates amounted to about 0.95
percentage points, about ¯ve percent of their original level. This estimated
average treatment e®ect however masks important heterogeneity in response
to the reform. According to our estimates, the magnitude of the estimated
exogenous treatment e®ect is downward biased by about 83 percent. On
the basis of the between-state di®erence in di®erence analysis, moreover, we
conclude that the reform raised the average level of taxes in the reform state.
These results are robust to alternative choices of the estimation procedures
and the inclusion of alternative control variables.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops
the theoretical hypotheses. Section 3 reviews the features of the German
municipal equalization system and explains the reform e®ects from a theo-
retical perspective. The data are presented in Section 4, while Sections 5
and 6 summarize the empirical strategy and the results. The last section
concludes with a summary of the major ¯ndings.
2 Equalization and tax competition
To understand the incentive e®ects of equalization grants, consider a version
of the model in KÄ othenbÄ urger (2002) and Bucovetsky and Smart (2006). A
federation consists of two jurisdictions, labelled i and j, each with a single
resident and a single tax base. Jurisdiction i levies tax rate ¿i on its own
base Bi. Let the tax base in jurisdiction i be a linear function of tax rates
in the federation,
Bi = B0
i + c¿j ¡ a¿i (1)
where B0
i and a > c ¸ 0 are parameters. Thus the model incorporates a
¯scal spillover (e.g. tax competition where Bi is the capital tax base) among
jurisdictions when c > 0, since a rise in the tax rate in one jurisdiction causes
a rise in the other jurisdiction's tax base.
Each jurisdiction receives from the central government an equalization
grant that compensates for di®erences in the size of the local tax bases. For
jurisdiction i, the transfer formula is
Ti = ®i (Ni ¡ Bi); (2)
5where Ni is a parametric lump-sum component to the grant representing the
jurisdiction's deemed \¯scal need", and ®i is the rate at which the grant is
reduced for each unit of local ¯scal capacity or tax base Bi. (The variables
for jurisdiction j are de¯ned analogously.) Note that we allow marginal
equalization rates ®i to di®er between jurisdictions; capturing the possibility
that jurisdictions operate on di®erent segments of a non-linear equalization
scheme. In particular, this subsumes the case in which one jurisdiction is not
eligible for equalization transfers (®i = 0), perhaps because it has exogenous
¯scal capacity that exceeds deemed ¯scal need, while the other jurisdiction
remains eligible for equalization payments (®j > 0).
Consider the problem of a government in region i that seeks to maximize
revenue net of federal equalization transfers, and which takes the parameters
of the equalization formula and the tax rate of the other jurisdiction as
given.4 In this model, the optimal tax rate ¿i solves
max ¿iBi + ®i (Ni ¡ Bi)
for which the ¯rst-order (necessary and su±cient) condition is
Bi ¡ a(¿¤
i ¡ ®i) = 0: (3)
The ¯rst-order condition de¯nes the optimal tax rate in region i as a func-
tion of the neighbor region's tax rate and its marginal equalization rate,
¿¤
i (¿j;®i). Using (1) comparative statics on ¿i yields an inverse relationship
between ¿i and region i's marginal equalization rate ®i.
In the empirical analysis below, we examine the impact of the equaliza-
tion formula on the reduced form tax rates of a®ected governments, without
regard for the structural interactions among tax rates as embodied in the
reaction function ¿¤
i (¿j;®i). To motivate this approach, therefore, we may
solve for the Nash equilibrium tax rates of the jurisdictions that consti-
tute a ¯xed point of the reaction functions. This can be interpreted as a
reduced form relationship between tax rates and equalization parameters,
¹ ¿¤
i (®i;®j).5 Our empirical work employs a \di®erence-in-di®erence" strat-
4The Leviathan assumption together with the linearity of the tax base in (1) greatly
simpli¯es the analysis, while preserving the essential features of the incentive e®ects of
equalizing transfers. The linear model was studied by Bucovetsky (1991) inter alia. The
e®ect of equalization transfers on welfare maximizing governments facing non-linear tax
bases is addressed in Smart (1998), and the qualitative results are the same.




















Observe that a > c ¸ 0 is su±cient to guarantee existence of a unique Nash equilibrium.
6egy that examines how the tax rates of jurisdictions change relative to each
other in response to a change in their relative marginal rates of equalization.
To see this relationship in the theoretical model, we may therefore compute
the di®erence in equilibrium tax rates
¹ ¿¤









(®i ¡ ®j) ´ ¯ij + °(®i ¡ ®j): (5)
The tax di®erential is positively related to the di®erential in equalization
rates pertaining to the respective jurisdictions.
3 Equalization transfers in Germany
In describing the municipal equalization scheme, we focus on the system in
Lower Saxony where a reform has been implemented as of 1999.
The core of the municipal transfer system is: (i) a system of \regular"
equalization grants, which compensate for a fraction of the amount by which
each municipality's measured taxation capacity falls short of its targeted
spending level or \¯scal need", and (ii) a system of supplementary equaliza-
tion grants, which establish a °oor level of spending in each municipality,
and equalize 100 per cent of de¯ciencies up to the °oor.
In algebraic terms, let Bi denote the measured tax capacity in munic-
ipality i; that is, the revenues that would be available for local spending
purposes if the jurisdiction were to levy a centrally determined reference tax
rate on its measured tax bases.6 Let Ni denote the \¯scal need" or target
spending level of the municipality{again, a centrally determined parameter
that depends only on the current population of the municipality. Let ®
be the rate at which capacity de¯ciencies are compensated under the regu-
lar equalization transfer. Finally, let ¯Ni denote the spending °oor below
which de¯ciencies are fully compensated under the supplementary equal-
ization transfer, where ¯ is a centrally (state-level) determined parameter
that is common to all municipalities within the same state. The aggregate
equalization transfer to the municipality may then be written:
Ti(Bi) = ®maxfNi ¡ Bi;0g + maxf¯Ni ¡ Bi ¡ ®(Ni ¡ Bi);0g (6)
6In practice the ¯scal capacity is the jurisdiction's tax base multiplied by a \standard"
tax rate. In the sequel we assume a \standard" tax rate equal to unity. Since its level has
no formulaic relation to the municipalities' business tax rate choices, the simpli¯cation
does not impair the analysis of incentive e®ects.
7Figure 1: Equalization transfers and incentives.
where the ¯rst term corresponds to the regular equalization transfer and
the second to the supplementary transfer (which itself depends on the ¯scal
capacity resulting from the regular transfer).7
Observe that the second term in the transfer formula, the supplementary





Ni ´ µNi (7)
where µ < 1. Thus µ in (7) expresses the fraction of target spending below
which capacity de¯ciencies are fully equalized.
This describes the state's horizontal equalization system in general terms
7In the transfer system described by equation (6), equalization is on a \gross" basis:
each transfer is positive if the corresponding de¯ciency is positive, and zero otherwise;
municipalities with capacity in exceed of ¯scal need are not taxed under the formula. In
fact, in the 1999 Lower Saxony reform discussed below, municipalities with excess capacity
were required to pay 20 per cent of the di®erence to the state government, converting the
actual formula to a partial \net" equalization basis. We return to this issue below.
8throughout our sample period. We turn now to the numerical values as-
sumed by the parameters in the formula and the changes in the parameters
following the 1999 reform|which is the key to our identi¯cation strategy.
The reform was initiated by a ruling of the state supreme court in November
1997 which declared the initial system unconstitutional and requested the
implementation of a new system as of 1999. The reform prescribed changes
in the di®erent equalization rates. Prior to the reform, the regular equal-
ization transfer compensated 50 per cent of de¯ciencies in capacity below
the target level, and the spending °oor was established at 80 per cent of
the target level; thus ®0 = 1=2 and ¯0 = 4=5 in the pre-reform period,
and µ0 = (4=5 ¡ 1=2)=(1=2) = 3=5 was the threshold fraction of the tar-
get below which supplementary equalization was paid. In the 1999 reform,
the regular equalization was increased to 75 per cent, while other param-
eters of the formula remained unchanged; thus ®1 = 3=4;¯1 = 4=5, and
µ1 = (4=5 ¡ 3=4)=(1=4) = 1=5. As we will see, this resulted in substantial
changes in municipal government incentives.
To understand the incentives for local tax policy induced by the transfer
system, it is useful to consider the graph of the equalization formula. Figure
1 expresses the relationship between a municipality's own ¯scal capacity Bi
and its equalization transfers Ti(Bi) in both the pre-reform and post-reform
periods. The kinked line segment ADNG is the constraint which obtains
in the pre-reform period: capacity de¯ciencies are fully compensated by
transfers when Bi · µ0Ni, so the constraint has slope -1 in this interval;
50 per cent of capacity de¯ciencies are compensated when µ0Ni < Bi · Ni,
so the slope of the constraint is -0.5 in this interval; and no equalization
transfers are paid when Bi > Ni, the slope of the constraint is thus zero
to the right of Ni. The post-reform budget constraint is represented by
the kinked line segment ACNH. The e®ect of the reform was to increase
the fraction of capacity de¯ciencies compensated by regular equalization
transfers to 75 per cent and so to increase the slope of the constraint by 0.25
(in absolute value) in the intermediate interval, while reducing the threshold
at which supplementary equalization was paid commensurately to µ1Ni.8
For governments with tax capacity in excess of need, operating on segment
NG, no equalization payments were received before or after the reform. In
8For governments initially operating on segment AC of the pre-reform constraint, there
was no change in marginal incentives. Observe however that the new threshold level was
extremely low, at 20 per cent of the target spending level. In consequence, only one
municipality has quali¯ed for supplementary transfers in the post-reform period. We
categorize this municipality as part of the treatment group 1 despite the fact that there
was no change in marginal incentives; this can only lead to attenuation bias in our results.
9the post-reform period, however, such municipalities were required to pay
20 per cent of excess tax capacity to the state government, operating now
on the segment NH with slope -0.2. Such a payment operates exactly like a
negative equalization grant with an equalization fraction of one-¯fth.
Thus the reform resulted in a rather stark change in the extent to which
marginal changes in local resources Bi are compensated through the formula.
Municipalities may be classi¯ed into three groups based on their equalization
status prior to the reform. Group 1, corresponding to segment CD of the
pre-reform budget constraint, faced a decrease in equalization fraction of 25
percentage points following the reform, while Groups 2 and 3, corresponding
to segments DN and NG, faced increases in the equalization fraction of 25
and 20 percentage points, respectively. According to our theory then, tax
rates among the former group of governments are predicted to fall, compared
to those of the other two groups.
It is this shock to incentives that is the key to our identi¯cation strategy,
described in further detail below. An obvious concern with this approach is
that factors that determine the initial equalization status of a municipality
may be related to the unobservable determinants of subsequent innovations
in tax rates, so that assignment to treatment and control groups is not
ignorable in our analysis. We describe our strategy for dealing with the
endogeneity issue in Section 5.
4 Data
We use data on municipalities in the state of Lower Saxony over the time
period 1994 - 2004. The described reform in Lower Saxony was e®ective as
of 1999. We use data on the business tax rate which is set at the munic-
ipal level in Germany, information on the transfer formula as given in (1)
before and after the reform for each municipality in Lower Saxony, and socio-
economic characteristics of the respective municipalities such as population
(inhabitants, age structure, and population density), income per capita, and
the unemployment rate. Also, we account for geographical characteristics
of a municipality (land used for agriculture, forests, water sheds, and size
of the road network each of which is measured in hectares). Finally, we
employ political characteristics such as the party composition of the local
government (social democrats, liberals, conservatives, and the greens). All
data except unemployment rates are available from the respective statisti-
cal o±ce (Statistische Landesamt), most of it is available in a on-line data
10base.9 Data on the number of unemployed at the municipal level are taken
from the Federal Labor O±ce (Bundesagentur fÄ ur Arbeit) - also available
on-line.10
In some of our estimations, we will employ data on Bavarian munici-
palities as a control group. In Bavaria, the reform described in Section 3
did not take place. The corresponding socio-economic, geographical and
political data come from the Bavarian statistical o±ce.11 Again, the unem-
ployment rates are taken from the Federal Labor O±ce (Bundesagentur fÄ ur
Arbeit).
In the subsequent analysis, we consider all municipalities in Lower Sax-
ony as supplementary transfer eligible ones if they have actually received
such transfers in at least one year in the pre-reform period (1994-98). In all
estimations, the remaining Lower Saxony municipalities belong to the con-
trol group. Table 1 provides details on the number of eligible and non-eligible
municipalities, the average business tax rate, the average ¯scal capacity per
capita as de¯ned by the equalization formula, and the average income per
capita across years and municipalities in the respective group.12
About three quarters of the 1022 municipalities in Lower Saxony were
supplementary transfer eligible in at least one year between 1994 and 1998.
The income per capita level is slightly lower in eligible municipalities than in
non-eligible ones. On average, they applied a slightly lower business tax rate
than their non-eligible counterparts, and their ¯scal capacity is signi¯cantly
lower. To give a ¯rst impression of the possible response of tax rates to
the reform, we illustrate the development of the business tax rates in Lower
Saxony in Figure 2. The vertical bar in the ¯gure indicates the end of the
last pre-reform year 1998. Business tax rates in this and earlier years were
about 0.15 percentage points higher in non-eligible municipalities than in
eligible ones. This is also consistent with the information given in Table 1.
Before the reform, there was not much change in this relationship. But the
¯gure suggests that the gap in the two tax rates increased immediately after
the reform year. The adjustment in the gap is somewhat sluggish and a new
'steady-state' in the gap seems to be reached only after four years.
The information in Figure 2 may also be inferred from a descriptive
comparison along the lines of regression analysis. In Table 2 we consider the
9The link is http://www1.nls.niedersachsen.de/Statistik/.
10The link is http://www.pub.arbeitsamt.de.
11The link is https://www.statistikdaten.bayern.de.
12The income per capita seems low, but note that the denominator includes all inhab-
itants of a municipality, irrespective of whether they are working, unemployed, or not in
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Figure 2: Average business tax rates of eligible and non-eligible municipali-
ties in Lower Saxony.
average business tax rate in the period 1994-97 in eligible versus non-eligible
municipalities and compare it to any later year, capturing supplementary
transfer eligibility by a dummy variable that is set at one for eligible munic-
ipalities and at zero for non-eligible ones. Of course, since 1998 was actually
not covered by the reform the change in the eligible regions should be as
large as in the non-eligible ones so that the gap does not increase. Hence,
the coe±cient of the eligibility status dummy variable should be close to zero
for 1998. In the subsequent periods, the increase in the gap should show up
in an increasingly negative coe±cient of the dummy variable of interest.
We ¯nd, consistent with Figure 2, that the gap opens up in 1999 (hence,
here is no indication of anticipation e®ects in 1998), reaching a level of about
-0.25 percentage points from 2003 onwards. The regression representation
will be useful for a comparison with the results in the subsequent analysis,
where we account for a possible self-selection into supplementary transfer
eligibility. The latter seems particularly important for municipalities oper-
ating next to the kinks of the budget constraint depicted in Figure 1. For
these, a small change in tax policy may signi¯cantly change the local slope
12of the non-linear budget constraint.
5 Empirical strategy
5.1 The problem of self-selection into supplementary trans-
fer eligibility
It will be useful to start with a few de¯nitions for portraying the problem
of identi¯cation of the supplementary transfer reform e®ect on business tax
rates at the municipal level and the outline of the empirical strategy. For
convenience, we will refer to the case of supplementary transfer recipient
status by index 1 (treatment status) and to the non-recipient status by index
0 (no-treatment status). The corresponding business tax rate of municipality
i with and without treatment status is ¿i;1 and ¿i;0, respectively. Since
we will focus on di®erences in di®erences of the reform e®ect, it will be
useful to de¯ne the pre-to-post-reform change in business tax rates of the
supplementary transfer eligible units as ¢¿i;1, and that one of the ineligible
ones as ¢¿i;0. Therein, ¢ is the di®erence operator across periods.
Notice that there are two treatments of interest, here: the reform e®ect,
which may be viewed as being exogenous from the viewpoint of a munic-
ipality, and the supplementary transfer status, which may be endogenous.
Let us refer to the binary supplementary transfer eligibility treatment for
municipality i as Zi with Zi = 1 in the treatment case (as Bi < µ0N in
Figure 1) and Zi = 0 otherwise. Let us ¯rst focus on di®erences in business
tax rates between the pre- and post-reform periods for Lower Saxony munic-
ipalities only. Then, we see that average e®ect of the exogenous treatment,
namely the supplementary transfer reform, is simply a constant. However, in
case of an endogenous selection of municipalities into supplementary trans-
fer eligibility status, the change in business tax rates between the pre- and
post-reform periods will depend on this endogenous selection. Providing a
consistent identi¯cation of both the main reform e®ect and its interaction
e®ect with the status of transfer eligibility on business tax rates (¢¿1¡¢¿0)
is central to the paper.
The econometrics literature emphasizes the role of two core concepts
of treatment e®ects: the average treatment e®ect (see Rubin, 1983) being
de¯ned as ATE ´ E[¢¿1 ¡ ¢¿0], where, in our case, ¢¿1 and ¢¿0 are
random vectors of changes in business tax rates from the population of
municipalities of interest; and the average treatment e®ect on the treated
(see Heckman, 1997), being de¯ned as ATT ´ E[¢¿1 ¡¢¿0jZ = 1]. Hence,
ATE is the unconditional, expected change in business tax rates associated
13with the reform e®ect for a randomly drawn municipality. In contrast, ATT
measures the expected treatment e®ect on a municipality that is randomly
drawn only from the sub-population of the actually supplementary transfer
eligible units.
If the supplementary transfer eligibility status were randomized across
municipalities, Z would be independent of (¢¿1;¢¿0). Then, E[¢¿1 ¡
¢¿0] = E[¢¿1 ¡ ¢¿0jZ = 1] implying that ATE = ATT. Furthermore,
the simple di®erence in the means of the pre-to-post-reform change in busi-
ness tax rates among the eligible and ineligible municipalities13 is an un-
biased, consistent, and asymptotically normal estimate of ATE and ATT.
However, if municipalities internalize their possible in°uence on the slope of
the budget constraint and adjust their tax rates accordingly, this creates a
problem of self-selection into treatment. Then, the assumption of a random-
ized or exogenous treatment is not tenable anymore, rendering the simple
di®erence-in-means estimator of the reform-induced supplementary transfer
treatment e®ect (of both ATE and ATT) on changes in business tax rates
biased and inconsistent. Accordingly, the response to the tax reform can not
be estimated by an ordinary least squares approach as in Table 2 anymore.
5.2 Cures for self-selection
The micro-econometrics literature on program evaluation suggests several
alternative avenues of how to recover consistent estimates of ATE and ATT
under self-selection. Here, we focus on those approaches that involve the
formulation of a non-linear probability model to estimate the endogenous
selection into treatment (in our case, the probability that a municipality is
eligible for supplementary transfers). We can think of the estimation of ATE
or ATT as a two-stage problem, where the binary choice selection model is
to be estimated in the ¯rst stage. In ¯rst stage regression, we determine the
probability of Z = 1 by a set of observable determinants. Let us refer to the
latter determinants as W, which is an N £ k1 matrix, where N indicates
the number of (treated plus untreated) observations in the sample, and k1
is the number of regressors included in the non-linear probability model
assuming either a normal or a logistic distribution function. In general,
there are two possibilities to obtain consistent estimates of ATE or ATT. One
involves the use of instrumental variable techniques (Wooldridge, 2002). The
other adopts the assumption of ignorability of treatment given the covariates
collected in W (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). In the subsequent analysis,
13As is easily available from descriptive statistics or as a simple exogenous dummy
variable estimate in a regression of ¢¿i on Zi (where ¢ is the di®erence operator).
14we will in particular make use of the latter, while an application of the
former is relegated to the sensitivity analysis.
In our context, the assumption of ignorability of treatment given the
covariates entails that provided the correlation between the binary supple-
mentary transfer eligibility Z and the business tax rate outcome (¢¿1;¢¿0)
can be eliminated by conditioning on W, we obtain consistent estimates of
ATE and ATT.14 Two prominent approaches to estimate treatment e®ects
based on the assumption of ignorability of treatment conditional on a set
of observable variables15 are (i) selection control procedures based on the
switching regression model and (ii) matching based on the propensity score.
As an (intuitively appealing) alternative to the aforementioned proce-
dures we can restrict the set of municipalities to those for which a self-
selection problem is less of a concern, i.e. those which do not operate in the
close neighborhood of the kink D of the transfer formula depicted in Figure
1. We present an analysis along these lines in section 6.3.
6 Results
6.1 Switching regression model
We ¯rst apply a switching regression model. Let us decompose the out-
comes for the treated and the untreated municipalities (¢¿k with k = 0;1)
into their mean (¹k) and a stochastic part (ºk), ¢¿k = ¹k + ºk. Then, we
may use the regression model ¢¿ = ¹0 + ¯Z + ² to estimate ATE, where
¯ = (¹1 ¡ ¹0) re°ects ATE and ² = º0 + Z(º1 ¡ º0) is an error term which
obviously depends on the supplementary transfer eligibility status Z. Since
the business tax rate outcome ¢¿ depends on Z, this is referred to as a
switching regression model. A two-step estimator that yields a consistent
estimate of ATE can be obtained as follows. First, estimate the probability
of being eligible for supplementary transfers depending on a set of instru-
14The assumption implies conditional mean-independence, which means that even
though (¢¿1;¢¿0) and Z are correlated (through self-selection), E[¢¿0jW;Z] =
E[¢¿0jW] and E[¢¿1jW;Z] = E[¢¿1jW]. Hence, there is a set of observable vari-
ables collected in W that can remove the correlation between (¢¿1;¢¿0) and Z, and after
conditioning on W, we can obtain consistent estimates of ATE and ATT. Under condi-
tional mean-independence, ATT conditional on W is de¯ned as ATT(W) ´ E[¢¿1 ¡
¢¿0jW;Z = 1] and ATE conditional on W is de¯ned as ATE(W) ´ E[¢¿1 ¡ ¢¿0jW].
Notice that ATT and ATE are identical under conditional mean-independence, and no
further restrictions on joint or conditional distributions are required for identi¯cation.
15Due to the reliance on a set of observables, the approach is sometimes also referred
to as selection on observables (Heckman and Robb, 1985; Mo±tt, 1996).
15ments W = [X;Y], where X is an N £k2 matrix of exogenous regressors in
the second stage model and Y is an N £ k1 set of identifying instruments
in the ¯rst stage model, with k1 denoting the number of regressors in the
second stage. Second, determine the expected value of business tax rates
conditional on supplementary transfer eligibility, a set of exogenous vari-
ables in the second stage model (collected in the matrix X), and on the set
of instruments in the ¯rst stage (W) as:16
E(¢¿jZ;X;W) = ®+¯Z+X°+½1ZÁ(W±)=©(W±)+½2ZÁ(W±)=[1¡©(W±)]
(8)
where W± = ±0 + X±1 + Y±2. This is a generalized version of the Heck-
man (1978) framework (Heckman's estimator is based on a single parameter
½ in the second stage model), which provides an unbiased, consistent, and
asymptotically normal estimate of ¯ (i.e., ATE) under standard assump-
tions.17 De¯ne ºk = gk(X)+ek with E(ek;W) 8k = 1;0 referring to treated
and untreated municipalities, respectively, to indicate that (a;e0;e1) is in-
dependent of W with a trivariate normal distribution by assumption. Then,
ATE can easily be estimated by a two-stage procedure similar to the one
proposed by Heckman (1978): estimate a probit or logit model to obtain
estimates of Á(W±) (i.e., the density of the standard normal evaluated at
W±) and ©(W±) (i.e., the cumulative density of the standard normal eval-
uated at W±); plug these estimates in the two inverse Mill's ratios of the
second stage linear regression model. Then, the coe±cients of the two Mill's
ratios ½k will control for the selection bias, rendering the estimates of ATE
as captured by ¯ unbiased, consistent, and asymptotically normal.
6.1.1 Propensity to be supplementary transfer eligible for Lower
Saxonian municipalities
We assume that W consists of the following socio-economic and geograph-
ical characteristics: a municipality's area of agricultural land in hectares
(as a measure of its degree of industrialization); the area of forest space in
hectares; the area of watersheds in hectares (as a measure of remoteness);
the area of paved streets in hectares (as a measure of a municipality's infras-
tructure endowment); per-capita GDP as of 1993 (i.e., in the pre-treatment
16Note that in the absence of Y ATE can still be identi¯ed if the non-linearity of the
¯rst-stage model is su±ciently informative (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
17The assumptions are that functional forms are as indicated and that supplementary
transfer eligibility can be written as an indicator function of the form Z = 1[W± +
a ¸ 0] and a is independently and identically distributed following a standard normal
distribution.
16period); population size as of 1993; the change in population density between
the pre- and post-treatment periods; the share of the population below an
age of 15 years as of 1993; and squared values of these eight variables. Hence,
including the constant, the column rank of W is 17.
Most notably the geographical variables are hypothesized to in°uence
the ¯scal capacity, but to be uncorrelated with the dependent variable of
the second-stage regression which is the change in the tax rate following the
reform. To illustrate the reasoning, return to the theoretical model of sec-
tion 2. Consider the baseline component of municipality i's tax base B0
i to
summarize the aforementioned variables; thus re°ecting the municipality's
propensity to qualify for supplementary transfers. The equilibrium tax rate
¹ ¿¤
i depends on B0
i , while the change in a jurisdiction's tax rate following a
reform of the equalization rates is independent of it - see (4).18 In section
6.3 we perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the set of covariates sum-
marized in W.
Table 3 provides a summary of the corresponding results for the selec-
tion model determining the probability of supplementary transfer eligibility.
It turns out that the squared variables are jointly signi¯cant and should be
included. Six variables enter signi¯cantly, irrespective of whether we assume
logistically (in the logit) or normally distributed errors (in the probit). In
particular, the probability of being treated as supplementary transfer eli-
gible declines with the share of people below working age, and it declines
in the pre-treatment level of per-capita income. The likelihood of being
treated is higher for regions with large water sheds. The reason is that these
regions are relatively remote. For both models, the pseudo R2 is fairly high
regarding the sample size of 1022 observations and the fairly large number
of treated ones, amounting to about 0:26. The log-likelihood of the logit
model is slightly higher than that one of the probit. However, the di®erence
is not signi¯cant according to a likelihood ratio test (this test is suggested
by Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004). In the subsequent analysis, we use the
slightly preferable logit model throughout.
6.1.2 Switching regression estimates for Lower Saxony
The second stage results of the switching regression approach are depicted
in Table 4. The estimates apply for a randomly selected municipality in
18Concretely, taking the di®erence of the equilibrium tax rate before and after the reform





17the Lower Saxony sample, irrespective of whether it was eligible for sup-
plementary transfers or not. We are primarily interested in the estimates
pertaining to the e®ect of supplementary transfer eligibility. These are to be
interpreted as tax rate changes (pre and post reform period) of the eligible
municipalities relative to those of non-eligible ones. They correspond to the
change in the tax rate gap between eligible and non-eligible municipalities
- similar to the illustration in Figure 2. As the pre-reform tax rate we take
the 1993/1997 average. Since the ¯scal adjustment to the reform might be
sluggish, we estimate the corresponding ATE for each post-reform year sep-
arately. Also, we check for possible anticipation e®ects by assigning 1998 to
the post-reform period. Recall, the reform became e®ective as of 1999 after
a supreme-court ruling in November 1997.
One concern with treatment estimates is that they might capture the
impact of omitted variables. To avoid this problem, we additionally control
for covariates in the second stage (outcome) regression. Recall that the ma-
trix of covariates has been referred to as X in Section 6.1 and, apart from
a constant and the endogenous supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower
Saxony, it collects the following determinants: the change in population
since 1993/1997; the change in population density; the area of streets in
hectares; the change in per-capita income since 1993/1997; and the change
in the share of elderly people (with an age of more than 65 years).
We have experimented with less parsimonious speci¯cations than the
one reported in Table 4. In particular, we have checked for the possible
relevance of unemployment rates, and other socio-economic and geographical
characteristics accounted for in the selection model. However, it turns out
that the less parsimonious model estimates are not signi¯cantly preferable
to the ones in the table. In particular, population density and the size of
the road network are the most important control variables according to their
signi¯cance.
Similar to the exogenous ATE estimates in Table 2, there is no indica-
tion of signi¯cant anticipation e®ects in 1998 with the endogenous treatment
approach. Put di®erently, the identi¯ed gap by 2003/2004 between the eli-
gible and non-eligible municipalities is three times larger than its exogenous
counterpart. Recall that the reference estimate was about -0.25 percentage
points in Table 2 whereas it amounts to -1.20 in the switching regression -
see Table 4. However, one may argue that most of the di®erence in the esti-
mates re°ects an omitted control variables bias rather than a self-selection
bias in Table 2. It turns out that this is not the case. We illustrate this
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Figure 3: Average treatment e®ect of being eligible for supplementary trans-
fers on business tax rates in Lower Saxony.
In the ¯gure, the dashed line at the top corresponds to the exogenous
simple comparison estimates of the average treatment e®ect as reported in
Table 2. The solid grey one in the middle re°ects exogenous treatment ef-
fect estimates where the same covariates as in Table 4 have been controlled
for. The solid black locus at the bottom of the ¯gure is based on the esti-
mates of the average treatment e®ect in Table 4. Obviously, the selection
bias rather than the omitted variables bias accounts for the lion's share in
the di®erence between the endogenous treatment e®ect estimates of Table
4 and the exogenous ones in Table 2. Recall that the average level of busi-
ness tax rates amounted to about 15.5 percent in the pre-reform period and
average Lower Saxony municipality. Accordingly, we might say that the
reform-induced change in the gap between the eligible and non-eligible com-
munities amounts to almost 10 percent of this level. Note that the constant
amounts to somewhat less than 2.4 in the 2004 results in Table 4. This is an
estimate of the change in the average community's business tax rate since
1994/97. Hence, a randomly drawn community's tax rate is increased by
about 50 percent less due to supplementary transfer eligibility. The latter
is unconditional on whether the community was actually eligible or not.
196.2 Matching based on the propensity score
In the previous analysis, we have focused on ATE, i.e. the treatment e®ect
unconditional on actual treatment status. In fact, this is the (group size)
weighted average of the ATT and the average treatment e®ect of the un-
treated (ATU). In a next step, we address the e®ect on the actually treated,
i.e. the ATT, by employing di®erent matching estimates of the role of sup-
plementary transfer eligibility for the tax reform e®ect in Lower Saxony.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) deploy an estimate of the probability
of treatment given the covariates W based on p(W) ´ Prob(Z = 1jW).
p(W) is the response probability (©(W±)), also referred to as the propen-
sity score. p(W) serves as a metric to determine similar observations among
the sub-samples of the treated and untreated observations (i.e., to construct
a valid control group). Besides ignorability of treatment in the sense of con-
ditional mean-independence, i.e., E(¢¿kjW;Z) = E(¢¿kjW) 8k = 0;1,
the approach of propensity score matching hinges upon the assumption
that 0 < p(W) < 1 (municipalities outside this support region have to
be dropped).19 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) refer to these two assump-
tions together as strong ignorability of treatment. In this case, E[Z(¢¿jZ =
1;p(W))] ¡ E[Z(¢¿jZ = 0;p(W))] = E[Z(¢¿1 ¡ ¢¿0)jp(W)]).20 With
matching, the vector of predicted probabilities of being treated (as supple-
mentary transfer eligible) is used to construct an appropriate control group
of ineligible municipalities with a similar probability of being eligible as the
actually treated ones.
The most prominent matching procedure is nearest neighbor (or one-to-
one) matching which works as follows: (i) determine a treated observation's
closest 'twin' in terms of the propensity score within the sub-sample of un-
treated observations; (ii) compute the di®erence in the scores between the
vector of treated and their matched twins; (iii) determine the average di®er-
ence which is an estimate of ATT. Alternatively, one could do the opposite
and match on each untreated observation its closest twin in the sub-sample
of treated ones. The latter would give an estimate of the average treatment
e®ect of the ATU (in this case, we subtract the vector of business tax rates
19Hence, there is an implicit trade-o® between goodness of ¯t in the selection model
and the number of observations that can be used for matching.
20Note that the use of a single indicator p(W) to determine the similarity of the treat-
ment and control group involves a further assumption: namely that the two groups are
not only similar with respect to p(W) but also with respect to each and every determinant
collected in W. Otherwise, similarity in p(W) might be an artefact. Hence, matching
is only meaningful if we pass a test on the similarity of the observables included in the
selection model.
20of the matched treated from that one of the untreated). Then, ATE is noth-
ing else than a sub-sample-size-weighted average of ATT and ATU. Hence,
propensity score matching overcomes the bias associated with self-selection
into treatment by determining a valid control group (see Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983, 1984, Abadie, 2005, Imbens, 2004) rather than removing the
selection bias through the inclusion of inverse Mill's ratios in a switching
regression model.
In general, the number of matched control units is either exogenously
imposed (such as in the just described one-to-one matching) or a critical in-
terval is determined with all unmatched municipalities in the corresponding
probability region around an eligible municipality's predicted probability of
being treated. Some estimators even use a large amount or all untreated
units as controls with their weight declining in the absolute di®erence to
a treated unit's predicted probability (the latter approach is referred to
as kernel matching). In the baseline analysis we resort to nearest neigh-
bor matching and employ alternative matching procedures in the sensitivity
analysis.
Nearest neighbor matching is based on the logit estimates in Table 3.
The second stage estimates are given in the top panel of Table 5.
It is obvious that the ATT of the tax rate gap amounts to about -0.27
(in 2002/2004) which is signi¯cantly smaller than ATE. This means that
an untreated municipality would have set a considerably smaller business
tax rate if it had been treated instead. Hence, the ATU is much larger in
absolute value than the ATT. The ATT is about as high as the exogenous,
biased ATE. But the bias in the exogenous ATE is driven by the underlying
ATU.
We report estimates of an alternative matching that involves the Bavar-
ian municipalities as a control group in the bottom panel of Table 5. Within
the 1994/2004 period the Bavarian state government kept the equalization
rates constant. The results suggest that the ATT in the larger sample is
quite similar to its counterpart that is based on Lower Saxony municipali-
ties only. This indicates that the matching quality is fairly good in either of
the samples. However, the augmented data set allows us to gauge the ex-
ogenous reform e®ect on the average Lower Saxony municipality besides its
interaction e®ect with supplementary transfer eligibility. This is impossible
to infer based on the Lower Saxony data set where other, non-reform e®ects
enter the constant as well. Our ¯ndings suggest that the average Lower
Saxony municipality had increased its tax rate by 1.16 percentage points by
2003, compared to its Bavarian counterpart. The positive coe±cient picks
21up the reform-related incentive e®ect (some municipalities are hypothesized
to increase the tax rate), but also income e®ects on the average Lower Sax-
ony municipality. Its interpretation may in principle also include signi¯cant
non-reform-related e®ects in the state of Bavaria which, however, we are not
aware of.
As to the gap in tax rates between eligible and non-eligible municipalities
in Lower Saxony, it increased by 0.26 percentage points over the same period
in accordance with the theoretical model.
6.3 Sensitivity analysis
We considered the robustness of the ATT estimates in several regards. First,
even though the balancing property is not violated in our application,21 one
concern might be that the exogenous variables in the selection model have
an impact on the change in business tax rates on their own. Then, they
should be controlled for in the matching models. Think of matching as a
regression that includes a constant and the treatment dummy variable in a
sample that consists only of the treated and the control units (this sample
would be twice the number of treated observations with nearest neighbor
matching). In principle, we can include other controls in this regression as
well (see Blundell and Costa Dias, 2002). This is done in the regressions
whose results are reported at the top of Table 6. The included covariates
are the same as in Table 3. Note that the results are very similar to those
in Table 5. Hence, we can conclude that there is no bias from omitting the
corresponding covariates in the second stage regression.
Second, there could be political covariates that could play a role instead.
To account for this, we include the shares of the four parties (conservatives,
social democrats, liberals, the greens) as possible determinants of changes
in the business tax rates. Although some of the political variables enter
signi¯cantly in the regressions, the results are again very similar to the
estimates in Table 5.
Third, we additionally account for the value added tax (VAT) whose
rate is set by the federal government, while the proceeds are shared with
municipalities. They may be thought of re°ecting income e®ects. Although
the VAT enters signi¯cantly in some of the regressions, it does not change
our estimates of the ATT of the tax reform in Lower Saxony.
21Hence, the treatment and control group are not di®erent with respect to the explana-
tory variables in the selection model.
22The ¯rst bloc of results in Table 6 refers to nonparametric matching
procedures such as radius and kernel matching. Note that these rely on
a larger sample of control municipalities than nearest neighbor matching.
This results in an increase in e±ciency but, in ¯nite samples, the match-
ing quality can be seriously smaller than with nearest neighbor matching.
However, in our application the di®erence to the original estimates in Table
6 is negligible. A second bloc of results provides the traditional Heckman
(1978) two-step estimates. Note that these are based on a regression where
the two Mill's ratios (reported in Table 4) are forced to exhibit the same
coe±cient. Not surprisingly, these estimates do not di®er too much from
their ATE counterparts in Table 4. Finally, we apply two instrumental vari-
able procedures suggested by Wooldridge (2002); i.e. Procedure 18.1 and a
variant of Procedure 18.3. In contrast to the matching and the switching
regression model, instrumental variable procedures rest on relatively weaker
assumptions regarding the available observable variables. However, they re-
quire the existence of identifying instruments that are correlated with the
selection indicator (the supplementary transfer eligibility), but not directly
with the outcome (the change in business tax rates). As explained above,
the variables which are most notably uncorrelated with the outcome of the
second-stage regression are the geographical variables of the ¯rst-stage re-
gression. It turns out that the corresponding ATE estimates are very similar
to the previous ones - see Table 6.
We undertake the same sensitivity analysis for the estimates that are
based on Lower Saxony and Bavaria - see Table 7. In general, the results
are similarly robust as the previous ones (note that the bloc of results at
the top of Table 7 should be compared to the ones in the bottom panel of
Table 5). However, with the larger sample of Bavarian control units the
non-parametric (radius and kernel) matching estimators obviously lose in
quality and cannot recommended any longer. Otherwise, the results are
generally very robust in all considered respects.
In a ¯nal set of experiments, we change the speci¯cation of the probit
model to investigate the sensitivity of the results in that regard. In Table
8 we consider Lower Saxony municipalities only, and the results in Table 9
are again based on the augmented sample including Bavarian municipalities
in addition. In this analysis, we con¯ne ourselves to two representative esti-
mators: one-to-one matching as far as ATT is concerned, and Wooldridge's
Procedure 18.1 instrumental variable estimator regarding ATE.
We estimate three alternative probit models. The ¯rst one represents
a rigorous second-order polynomial rather than only main e®ects and their
23squared values as in Table 3. Hence, this speci¯cation also includes a com-
prehensive set of interaction terms of the main e®ects as suggested by Rosen-
baum and Rubin (1983). A second model only includes variables that are
strictly exogenous, at least in the medium run: namely the geographical
variables such as agricultural land, forest land, and watersheds (simple and
squared values thereof).22 The third variant only relies upon population
and income variables variables in the pre-reform period: population, den-
sity, income per capita, and the share of people with an age of less than
15 years. With the speci¯cation based on geographical variables we obtain
parameter estimates larger in absolute value than in the original speci¯ca-
tions. However, the general pattern of the estimated e®ects resembles the
reference estimates.
An alternative way to deal with potential self-selection is to limit the
econometric analysis to those municipalities for which the problem is less
of a concern, i.e. which operate not too close to the kind D of the transfer
formula - see Figure 1. Constructing the treatment group, we exclude all
municipalities that were potentially able to a®ect their eligibility status. We
de¯ne these municipalities as ones that had a lower ratio of the critical-to-
actual ¯scal capacity ratio than the average transfer receiving municipality
(the critical ¯scal capacity is centrally determined). Among the group of
non-recipients, we treat those units as potentially being able to a®ect their
eligibility status that had a higher ratio than the average non-recipient unit.
After excluding these municipalities in each year, we estimate the regression
model underlying the results in Table 4. We obtain insigni¯cant parameter
estimates of 0.027 and -0.099 for 1998 and 1999, respectively. The parameter
estimates for the years 2000-2004 are -0.148, -0.150, -0.206, -0.327, and -
0.296. The estimates are signi¯cant at least at the ¯ve percent level. The size
and pattern of the results is remarkably similar to the matching estimates
in Table 7.
7 Conclusion
Capacity equalization grants have been adopted in many countries primar-
ily to a®ect interregional equity - but they may nevertheless in°uence local
22A reason for restricting the number of covariates in the binary choice model is that
matching estimators include a bias term that declines at stochastic order (N ¡1)=k, with
N being the number of observations and k denoting the number of observables in the
selection model. In small samples, this bias can be fairly large (see FrÄ olich, 2004, Abadie
and Imbens, 2006). With instrumental variable estimation, there is no presumption to
rely on a large number of identifying instruments, anyway.
24policy incentives and the e±ciency of the equilibrium tax system. Equal-
ization grants calculate transfer entitlements indirectly, using di®erences
in revenues calculated at deemed rather than actual tax rates. But when
measured tax bases respond negatively to tax rate increases, this formula
may induce higher levels of taxation: increasing local tax rates causes mea-
sured tax bases to decline, as economic activity shifts to other regions of
the country or to other, more lightly taxed forms|and so causes capacity
equalization transfers to rise. Thus the grants in e®ect subsidize increases
in taxes by equalization-receiving governments.
The paper empirically analyzes the incentive e®ects of equalizing trans-
fers on business tax policy by exploiting a natural experiment in the state of
Lower Saxony which changed its equalization formula as of 1999. Relying on
within-state and across-state di®erence-in-di®erence estimates, the analysis
reveals a signi¯cant impact of the reform on municipalities' tax policy in
the four years after the reform with a \phasing out" of the e®ect starting in
the fourth to ¯fth year. The ¯nding is robust to various alternative speci¯-
cations. The empirical result is in line with the theoretical prediction of a
positive incentive e®ect of equalization grants on local tax rates.
From a policy perspective, the analysis suggests that ¯scal capacity
equalization implicitly acts as a tax coordination scheme, which deters mu-
nicipalities from lowering taxes in order to attract a larger tax base (since it
would result in a reduction in transfers) and which therefore mitigates ¯scal
competition.23 Our reduced form approach does not allow us to determine
the extent to which the tax-raising e®ect of equalization is in fact mitigated
by the e®ects of ¯scal competition among German municipalities that would
otherwise have reduced consumer welfare. But this interpretation is in line
with the observation that the federal corporate tax rate fell from 56% on
retained earnings and 36% on distributed earnings in 1980 to a uniform
rate of 26.25% as of 2001 (in successive tax-cut cum base-broadening re-
forms), a trend that is often attributed to intensi¯ed ¯scal competition. On
the other hand, municipal business tax rates on average did not fell over
the same period, suggesting that some mechanism { perhaps equalization
grants|insulates these jurisdictions from ¯scal competition.24
23Indeed, KÄ othenbÄ urger (2002) and Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) show that, in the
presence of horizontal tax competition, equalization grant may in a wide variety of settings
induce subnational governments to independently choose tax rates that increase welfare.
24The federal corporate tax base is nearly perfectly co-occupied by the municipalities'
business tax such that the broadening of the tax base does not account for the asymmetric
response.
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27Table 1 - Descriptive statistics Lower Saxony
Eligible Non-eligible All
Number of municipalities 748 274 1022
Business tax rate in percent (mean) 15,51 15,63 15,54
Fiscal capacity per capita in Euros (mean) 333,54 466,59 369,21
Income per capita in Euros per annum (mean) 9169 10698 9579
Supplementary transfer eligibility in at leat one year of 
1994-98Table 2 - Descriptive comparison of change in business tax rates for supplementary transfer eligible municipalities versus non-eligible ones in Lower Saxony
(Reported estimates are with respect to changes as compared to 1994-1997 average levels)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony -0,026 -0,116 ** -0,188 *** -0,184 *** -0,224 *** -0,258 *** -0,249 ***
0,042 0,047 0,051 0,057 0,070 0,078 0,080
Constant 0,412 *** 0,548 *** 0,698 *** 0,817 *** 1,059 *** 1,280 *** 1,449 ***
0,036 0,041 0,044 0,050 0,062 0,068 0,071
*** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent.Table 3 - Selection into supplementary transfer eligibility (Lower Saxony)
Logit Probit
Agricultural land as of 1993 (in ha) -2,515 -1,522
2,942 1,713
Forest as of 1993 (in ha) 0,769 0,341
2,742 1,597
Water as of 1993 (in ha) 40,824 *** 24,545 ***
11,338 6,607
Streets as of 1993 (in ha) 2,121 1,010
5,570 3,164
Per-capita income as of 1993 0,001 0,000
0,001 0,000
Population size as of 1993 0,000 0,000
0,000 0,000
Population density as of 1993 0,198 0,098
0,167 0,096
Population share with age≤15 as of 1993 -95,616 *** -55,447 ***
34,098 19,698
Square of agricultural land as of (in ha) 3,457 1,996
3,190 1,860
Square of forest as of (in ha) -0,590 -0,262
3,847 2,250
Square of water as of (in ha) -341,586 *** -205,735 ***
115,924 66,437
Square of streets as of (in ha) 0,276 0,138
12,558 7,130
Square of per-capita income as of 1993 -8,19E-08 ** -3,36E-08 *
3,82E-08 2,03E-08
Square of population size as of 1993 1,59E-11 9,16E-12
5,20E-11 2,72E-11
Square of population density as of 1993 -0,014 -0,007
0,019 0,010
Square of population share with age≤15 as of 1993 289,766 *** 168,152 ***
94,544 54,521





Joint exclusion of squares (LR-test statistic) 34,791 33,485
     P-value 0,000 0,000
Probit vs. Logit (LR-test statistic) 2,380
     P-value 0,123
*** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.Table 4 - Endogenous average treatment effect of  supplementary transfer eligibility on the change in business tax rates in Lower Saxony
(Reported estimates are with respect to changes as compared to 1994-1997 average levels)
Explanatory variables 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony -0,245 -0,379 ** -0,590 ** -0,746 *** -0,723 ** -1,187 *** -1,122 ***
0,216 0,231 0,268 0,301 0,356 0,395 0,443
Change in population since 1993/1997 0,00001 0,00002 -0,00001 -0,00005 -0,00004 -0,000001 0,000004
0,0001 0,0000 0,00004 0,00004 0,00004 0,00004 0,000042
Population density -0,020 -0,018 -0,039 ** -0,062 *** -0,071 *** -0,098 *** -0,111 ***
0,014 0,015 0,017 0,019 0,024 0,026 0,029
Streets (in ha) -0,7786 ** -0,9900 *** -1,0126 *** -1,4397 *** -1,2055 ** -0,7927 -1,1143
0,3364 0,3525 0,3533 0,3901 0,5863 0,7429 0,7764
Change in per-capita income since 1993/1997 -0,00001 -0,00001 -0,000003 0,00001 0,00002 0,00002 -0,00001
0,00001 0,00001 0,00001 0,00002 0,00002 0,00003 0,00004
Change in share of elderly people (age>65) 3,3788 4,6107 ** 1,6898 2,3633 -1,1735 -1,9377 -2,5617
2,5616 2,1210 2,0142 2,1867 2,1839 2,2878 2,1673
Constant 0,683 *** 0,857 *** 1,162 *** 1,468 *** 1,624 *** 2,193 *** 2,357 ***
0,207 0,221 0,257 0,289 0,345 0,380 0,433
Inverse Mills' ratio of treated 0,042 0,019 0,067 0,073 0,217 0,473 ** 0,575 **
0,124 0,136 0,151 0,182 0,218 0,241 0,256
Inverse Mills' ratio of untreated 0,161 0,206 0,301 * 0,429 ** 0,323 0,595 ** 0,494 *
0,155 0,164 0,188 0,209 0,253 0,277 0,312
*** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.
Notes: Reported figures are instrumental variable based estimated changes as compared to 1994-1997 average levels. Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony is 
endogenous.Table 5 - Endogenous average treatment effect of the supplementary transfer treated on the change in business tax rates in Lower Saxony
(Reported estimates are propensity score nearest neighbor matching based with respect to changes as compared to 1994-1997 average levels)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony -0,016 -0,069 -0,230 *** -0,189 ** -0,267 ** -0,294 *** -0,258 ***
     (incl. controls as in Table 4) 0,067 0,070 0,071 0,082 0,108 0,059 0,115
Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony -0,056 -0,078 * -0,182 *** -0,229 *** -0,246 *** -0,265 *** -0,263 ***
     (incl. controls as in Table 4) 0,042 0,045 0,048 0,057 0,067 0,074 0,078
Lower Saxony dummy 0,419 *** 0,432 *** 0,615 *** 0,748 *** 0,957 *** 1,090 *** 1,162 ***
     (incl. controls as in Table 4) 0,046 0,048 0,052 0,062 0,073 0,080 0,084
*** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.
Lower Saxonian municipalities only
Lower Saxonian and Bavarian municipalities
Notes: Reported estimates are propensity score nearest neighbor matching based with respect to changes as compared to 1994-1997 average levels. Supplementary transfer 
eligibility in Lower Saxony is endogenous.Table 6 - Sensitivity analysis (Lower Saxonian municipalities only)
(Reported estimates are changes as compared to 1994-1997 average levels)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Matching estimators (ATT):
  Nearest neighbor matching  -0,015 -0,073 * -0,232 *** -0,196 *** -0,270 *** -0,291 *** -0,257 ***
     (incl. controls as in Table 4) 0,039 0,042 0,046 0,050 0,063 0,068 0,069
  Nearest neighbor matching  -0,019 -0,073 * -0,232 *** -0,195 *** -0,270 *** -0,291 *** -0,258 ***
     (incl. controls as before plus political variables) 0,039 0,042 0,046 0,050 0,063 0,067 0,068
  Nearest neighbor matching  -0,019 -0,090 ** -0,246 *** -0,200 *** -0,280 *** -0,302 *** -0,272 ***
     (incl. controls as before plus change in VAT) 0,039 0,043 0,046 0,050 0,063 0,067 0,069
  Caliper matching -0,039 -0,135 *** -0,207 *** -0,199 *** -0,260 *** -0,270 *** -0,267 ***
     (radius is 0.1 - incl. controls as in Table 4) 0,039 0,042 0,045 0,050 0,063 0,068 0,070
  Kernel matching -0,032 -0,121 *** -0,196 *** -0,182 *** -0,244 *** -0,247 *** -0,257 ***
     (epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth of 0.8 - incl. controls as in Table 4) 0,038 0,042 0,044 0,050 0,063 0,068 0,069
Heckman (1978) estimator (ATE): -0,199 -0,304 -0,495 ** -0,602 ** -0,680 ** -1,137 *** -1,154 ***
     (first stage as in Table 2; second stage as in Table 4 plus inverse Mill's ratio) 0,197 0,213 0,229 0,261 0,318 0,363 0,376
Instrumental variable estimators (ATE):
  Wooldridge's (2002, p. 623) Procedure 18.1  -0,182 -0,256 -0,419 * -0,509 * -0,632 * -1,066 *** -1,171 ***
     (first stage as in Table 2; second stage as in Table 4 plus Φ(Wδ))
a) 0,191 0,213 0,244 0,276 0,326 0,391 0,430
  Wooldridge's (2002, p. 629) Procedure 18.3 -0,179 -0,254 -0,416 * -0,508 * -0,631 ** -1,075 *** -1,187 ***
     (first stage as in Table 2 plus φ(Wδ) and Φ(Wδ); second stage as in Table 4 plus φ(Wδ))
a)
0,188 0,208 0,241 0,274 0,320 0,379 0,411
*** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.
a) φ(Wδ) and Φ(Wδ) are the density and joint density, respectively, evaluated at the estimated parameter vector δ in the probit model.
Notes: Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony is endogenous. Reported estimates are average treatment effects of the treated for changes in business tax rates as compared to 1994-1997 average levels. Table 7 - Sensitivity analysis (Lower Saxonian and Bavarian municipalities; all estimators as in Table 5 plus Lower Saxony dummy)
(Reported estimates are changes as compared to 1994-1997 average levels)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Matching estimators (ATT):
  Nearest neighbor matching (incl. controls as in Table 4)
     Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony -0,069 -0,097 ** -0,209 *** -0,267 *** -0,289 *** -0,303 *** -0,306 ***
0,043 0,045 0,049 0,058 0,068 0,075 0,079
     Lower Saxony dummy 0,445 *** 0,464 *** 0,659 *** 0,819 *** 1,042 *** 1,155 *** 1,232 ***
0,047 0,050 0,054 0,066 0,078 0,085 0,089
  Nearest neighbor matching (incl. prev. controls plus political variables)
     Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony -0,052 -0,085 * -0,204 *** -0,284 *** -0,314 *** -0,334 *** -0,334 ***
0,044 0,046 0,050 0,058 0,069 0,076 0,080
     Lower Saxony dummy 0,423 *** 0,446 *** 0,650 *** 0,848 *** 1,081 *** 1,201 *** 1,275 ***
0,049 0,052 0,057 0,067 0,080 0,087 0,092
  Nearest neighbor matching (incl. prev. controls plus change in VAT)
     Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony -0,055 -0,093 ** -0,215 *** -0,273 *** -0,308 *** -0,337 *** -0,346 ***
0,044 0,047 0,051 0,059 0,070 0,077 0,081
     Lower Saxony dummy 0,426 *** 0,457 *** 0,664 *** 0,838 *** 1,075 *** 1,204 *** 1,286 ***
0,050 0,053 0,057 0,068 0,080 0,088 0,093
  Caliper matching (radius is 0.1 - incl. controls as in Table 4)
     Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony 0,017 -0,058 ** -0,117 *** -0,112 *** -0,145 *** -0,186 *** -0,177 ***
0,026 0,028 0,030 0,035 0,041 0,045 0,048
     Lower Saxony dummy 0,330 *** 0,448 *** 0,577 *** 0,659 *** 0,877 *** 1,057 *** 1,137 ***
0,028 0,031 0,033 0,038 0,045 0,049 0,051
  Kernel matching (epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth of 0.8 - incl. controls as in Table 4)
     Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony 0,018 -0,056 ** -0,121 *** -0,117 *** -0,155 *** -0,189 *** -0,172 ***
0,026 0,028 0,030 0,035 0,041 0,045 0,047
     Lower Saxony dummy 0,330 *** 0,448 *** 0,583 *** 0,667 *** 0,889 *** 1,065 *** 1,138 ***
0,028 0,030 0,033 0,038 0,044 0,049 0,051
Heckman (1978) estimator (ATE) - incl. controls as in Table 4:
     Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony -0,056 -0,184 *** -0,271 *** -0,223 *** -0,367 *** -0,450 *** -0,479 ***
0,061 0,066 0,072 0,084 0,096 0,111 0,118
     Lower Saxony dummy 0,367 *** 0,504 *** 0,645 *** 0,704 *** 0,948 *** 1,135 *** 1,216 ***
0,032 0,036 0,039 0,046 0,052 0,059 0,063
Instrumental variable estimators (ATE) - incl. controls as in Table 4:
  Wooldridge's (2002, p. 623) Procedure 18.1 
     Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony -0,062 -0,199 ** -0,290 *** -0,256 ** -0,411 *** -0,470 *** -0,500 ***
0,073 0,081 0,088 0,104 0,120 0,138 0,144
     Lower Saxony dummy 0,369 *** 0,509 *** 0,653 *** 0,716 *** 0,965 *** 1,142 *** 1,224 ***
0,041 0,046 0,049 0,056 0,069 0,077 0,079
  Wooldridge's (2002, p. 629) Procedure 18.3
     Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony -0,032 -0,154 * -0,245 *** -0,188 * -0,361 *** -0,454 *** -0,476 ***
0,079 0,086 0,092 0,109 0,126 0,143 0,149
     Lower Saxony dummy 0,393 *** 0,545 *** 0,690 *** 0,771 *** 1,005 *** 1,158 *** 1,248 ***
0,041 0,047 0,051 0,057 0,071 0,080 0,082
*** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.
Notes: Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony is endogenous. Reported estimates are average treatment effects of the treated for changes in business tax rates as compared to 1994-1997
average levels. Table 8 - Sensitivity analysis with respect to specification of the probit model (Lower Saxonian municipalities only)
(Reported estimates are changes as compared to 1994-1997 average levels)
Probit specification 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Nearest neighbor matching (ATT) - incl. controls as in Table 4:
  Probit specification A
a) -0,483 -0,527 -0,875 -1,160 -1,462 -2,797 ** -3,130 **
0,575 0,636 0,734 0,835 0,986 1,172 1,282
  Probit specification B
b) -0,675 -0,699 -1,153 -1,554 -1,973 -3,868 ** -4,335 **
0,817 0,900 1,056 1,204 1,420 1,692 1,841
  Probit specification C
c) -0,951 -0,937 -1,577 -2,162 -2,738 -5,462 ** -6,152 **
1,193 1,318 1,497 1,697 2,026 2,442 2,621
Wooldridge's (2002, p. 623) Procedure 18.1 (ATE) - incl. controls as in Table 4:
  Probit specification A
a) -0,035 -0,158 *** -0,225 *** -0,216 *** -0,296 *** -0,372 *** -0,398 ***
0,039 0,044 0,046 0,050 0,065 0,072 0,072
  Probit specification B
b) -0,005 -0,071 * -0,140 *** -0,159 *** -0,234 *** -0,212 *** -0,247 ***
0,038 0,041 0,043 0,049 0,063 0,067 0,070
  Probit specification C
c) -0,087 * -0,189 *** -0,276 *** -0,276 *** -0,309 *** -0,377 *** -0,451 ***
0,040 0,044 0,046 0,052 0,062 0,070 0,073
*** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.
Notes: Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony is endogenous. Reported estimates are average treatment effects of the treated for changes in business tax rates as compare
a) Full second-order polynomial function: probit specification as in Table 2 plus interaction terms among the non-squared regressors.
b) Probit specification that only includes the following variables measuring area in hectares: agricultural land, forest land, watersheds, and their  squared values.
c) Probit specification that only includes per-capita income as of 1993, population as of 1993, population density as of 1993, and the population share with age ≤15 as of 1993.Table 9 - Sensitivity analysis with respect to specification of the probit model (Lower Saxonian and Bavarian municipalities)
(Reported estimates are changes as compared to 1994-1997 average levels)
Probit specification 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Nearest neighbor matching (ATT) - incl. controls as in Table 4:
  Probit specification A
a)  
     Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony -0,027 -0,136 *** -0,229 *** -0,119 * -0,140 * -0,183 ** -0,137
0,044 0,048 0,051 0,061 0,073 0,082 0,086
     Lower Saxony dummy 0,368 *** 0,510 *** 0,687 *** 0,672 *** 0,889 *** 1,034 *** 1,046 ***
0,052 0,057 0,060 0,065 0,079 0,088 0,092
  Probit specification B
b)
     Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony -0,026 -0,123 ** -0,275 *** -0,294 *** -0,438 *** -0,434 *** -0,439 ***
0,048 0,052 0,058 0,066 0,078 0,085 0,089
     Lower Saxony dummy 0,365 *** 0,494 *** 0,705 *** 0,817 *** 1,159 *** 1,314 *** 1,326 ***
0,050 0,054 0,060 0,070 0,083 0,091 0,096
  Probit specification C
c)
     Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony 0,018 -0,112 ** -0,154 *** -0,221 *** -0,252 *** -0,311 *** -0,324 ***
0,046 0,051 0,055 0,057 0,070 0,076 0,078
     Lower Saxony dummy 0,326 *** 0,476 *** 0,589 *** 0,797 *** 1,018 *** 1,232 *** 1,366 ***
0,048 0,054 0,058 0,067 0,083 0,090 0,092
Wooldridge's (2002, p. 623) Procedure 18.1 (ATE) - incl. controls as in Table 4:
  Probit specification A
a)
     Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony -0,131 -0,350 * -0,478 ** -0,572 -1,261 ** -1,606 ** -1,785 **
0,178 0,197 0,213 0,467 0,532 0,694 0,727
     Lower Saxony dummy 0,372 *** 0,516 *** 0,660 *** 0,720 *** 0,988 *** 1,187 *** 1,273 ***
0,044 0,050 0,054 0,063 0,077 0,087 0,089
  Probit specification B
b)
     Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony -0,242 -0,571 -0,745 * -0,577 -1,270 ** -1,419 ** -1,586 **
0,325 0,360 0,387 0,462 0,530 0,610 0,644
     Lower Saxony dummy 0,377 *** 0,516 *** 0,658 *** 0,716 *** 0,974 *** 1,152 *** 1,235 ***
0,043 0,048 0,052 0,059 0,073 0,082 0,085
  Probit specification C
c)
     Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony -0,220 -0,552 -0,744 * -0,380 -0,766 *** -0,890 *** -0,974 ***
0,320 0,358 0,391 0,255 0,292 0,344 0,361
     Lower Saxony dummy 0,372 *** 0,519 *** 0,670 *** 0,714 *** 0,978 *** 1,165 *** 1,246 ***
0,046 0,052 0,057 0,061 0,075 0,084 0,087
Notes: Supplementary transfer eligibility in Lower Saxony is endogenous. Reported estimates are average treatment effects of the treated for changes in business tax rates as compared to 1994-1997 average levels. 
a) Full second-order polynomial function: probit specification as in Table 2 plus interaction terms among the non-squared regressors.
b) Probit specification that only includes the following variables measuring area in hectares: agricultural land, forest land, watersheds, and their squared values.
c) Probit specification that only includes per-capita income as of 1993, population as of 1993, population density as of 1993, and the population share with age≤15 as of 1993.CESifo Working Paper Series 
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